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Resumen 
El procedimiento convencional para la evaluación cuanti-
tativa de riesgos de instalaciones industriales o áreas indus-
triales, así como la planeación del uso de la tierra en relación 
a los principales peligros de accidentes deberían incluir es-
cenarios de accidentes generados por factores externos de 
riesgos. En particular, el efecto dominó (también conocido 
como escalación o encadenados) debido a i) lugares cerca-
nos, ii) eventos naturales como terremotos o inundaciones, 
iii) maloperaciones internacionales que, principalmente, se 
da por  la interferencia de actos malintencionados. Una pers-
pectiva de estos problemas se mostrará a continuación y se 
discutirán los enfoques actuales y futuros disponibles para la 
evaluación cuantitativa de estos factores externos de riesgo 
en el marco de la evaluación cuantitativa de riesgos (QRA).
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Abstract
The conventional procedure for the Quantitative Risk 
Assessment of industrial installations or industrial areas, 
as well as for Land Use Planning with respect to major 
accident hazards should include the accident scenarios 
triggered by external hazard factors. In particular, domi-
no effects (also known as escalation or knock-on) due to 
	
-
ding; iii) intentional misoperation, due malicious acts of 
interference. An insight of these issues will be provided 
in the following, jointly to a discussion of the current 
and the future approaches available for the quantitative 
assesment of these external hazard factors in a QRA fra-
mework.
Introduction
Quantitative Risk Analysis is manda-
tory in good engineering practices for 
the safe running of chemical/industrial 
processes where hazardous substances 
are stored or manipulated. Neverthe-
less, deep inconsistencies, technical 
narrow-mindedness, or even neglecting 
possible severe hazardous scenarios 
emerge when international guidelines, 
enforced norms, published papers and 
open or commercial software are analy-
sed in the light of the hazard posed by 
external factors.
The population and the control autho-
  
    -
prehensive approach to risk analysis: 
that calls for multi-disciplinary (multi-
risk) methods able to consider all risk 
interdependences [4], [5], [34],[33].
Besides these considerations, speci-
   
  

extend the risk assessment to include 
hazard factors. Quantitative Risk As-
sessment tools need to be applied to 
large scale complex systems such as 
industrial areas, chemical clusters and 
industrial parks, offshore plants and 
terminals, large installations, in-town 
production and storage plants. Indeed, 
several risk installations often co-exist 
in the same area, thus, possibly leading 
to hundreds of possible accidental sce-
narios, which, in turn, may possibly in-
teract with surrounding urban areas and 
industrial installation.
Within this framework, the present 
contribution is focused on three speci-
     
be considered in the general procedure 
for risk assessment: i) escalation from 
nearby plants resulting in the domino 
effect (also known as cascade events 
or knock-on) that are catastrophic 
industrial accidents triggered by a pri-
mary escalation vector (a blast wave 
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narios. Thus, a necessary starting point 
      
must be intended as a domino acciden-
tal event, at least within the framework 
of the present study.
 The analysis of the technical litera-
ture and of case histories concerning 
past accidents shows that all the ac-
cidental sequences where a relevant 
domino effect took place have at 
least three common features:
i) A primary accidental scenario, which 
initiates the domino accidental se-
quence;
ii)The propagation of the primary 
event, due to an “escalation vector” 
generated by the physical effects of 
the primary scenario that results in 
the damage of at least one secondary 
equipment item;
iii) One or more secondary events (i.e. 
   
involving the damaged equipment 
items (the number of secondary 
events is usually the same of the da-
maged plant items).
It is important to recognize that, in 
order to be relevant in a QRA or in a 
land-use planning framework, the ove-
rall severity of the domino accident 
should be higher or at least comparable 
to that of the primary event. As a con-
clusion, for a relevant domino effect 
to take place, the “propagation” of the 
primary event has to be associated to an 
“escalation” of the overall scenario.
The assessment of possible domino 
    
of the possible secondary targets that 
may be damaged by the primary event. 
This is usually performed by employing 
damage thresholds. As a matter of fact, 
the use of un-necessary conservative 
-
cident escalation may turn out to be—in 
extremely high safety distances—im-
practical or unacceptable from a techni-
cal and economic point of view. Moreo-
ver, the use of extremely conservative 
thresholds for accident propagation re-
sults in the need to assess a huge num-
ber of possible secondary scenarios, in 
particular if complex lay-outs are consi-
dered. It must be remarked that the pos-
sible damage of secondary units by a 
single primary event results in the pos-
sibility of 2n different domino scenarios 
to be assessed in a QRA [17]. Therefore, 
	-
tion scenarios based on reliable models 
for equipment damage is a central issue 
to allow the risk assessment and control 
of domino accidents.
The analysis of more than 100 domino 
accidents recorded in a well known data-
	!"$%
physical effects responsible for the esca-
lation that started the secondary scenarios. 
These were named “escalation vectors” in 
the following, and are listed in Table 1. 
due to an explosions, radiation caused by 
&	
-
phic vessel failure) originated by a pri-
mary accidental scenario; ii) risks due to 
natural events interacting with industrial 
equipment; iii) risks related to a volun-
tary attack of an industrial installation. 
Domino effect
Domino effects are responsible for se-
veral catastrophic accidents that took 
place in the chemical and process in-
dustry. Hence, increasing attention is 
being paid to the analysis of this phe-

literature, starting from the pioneering 
studies carried out in the ‘90s [6], [12], 
[25], [27]. Quite obviously, the high 
severity of domino accidents also cau-
sed much concern in the legislation and 
in the technical standards aimed at the 
assessment and the prevention of acci-
dent escalation. In particular, the Euro-
pean legislation for the control of ma-
jor accident hazards and for land-use 
planning in the vicinity of hazardous 
industrial sites requires that all the pos-
sible accidental scenarios caused by the 
domino effect are taken into account. 
' 
   
falling under the obligations of the “Se-
veso” Directives (96/82/EC, 1996, and 
2012/18/EU, 2012) must identify do-
mino scenarios either within the plant 
boundaries or involving nearby plants. 
However, the lack of well assessed and 
widely accepted procedures for the es-
timation of the probability and even of 
the possibility of domino effects result 
-
tion of these regulations, as well as in 
the elaboration and in the evaluation of 
safety reports.
The AIChE-CCPS guidelines [9] for 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) 
     * -
dent which starts in one item and may 
affect nearby items by thermal, blast, or 
fragment impact”, causing an increase 
in consequence severity or in failu-
re frequencies. Despite its clarity, the 
sentence is open to different interpre-
tations and to different assumptions in 
the analysis of domino accidental sce-
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As shown in Table 1, toxic releases 
should not be considered a possible 
escalation vector. Indeed, this type of 
scenario was excluded from the present 
analysis because the physical effect 
(toxic concentration) does not result di-
rectly in a loss of containment (LOC) or 
in the damage of secondary equipment, 
even if toxic releases may cause escala-
tion effects due to errors in emergency 
procedures and/or in emergency mana-
gement following the primary accident 
(see also [28], for further details).
As a matter of fact, among the factors 
 	
-
-
tion vectors in the scenario considered 
may play an important role (e.g. the du-


possibility of escalation due to radia-
tion). Furthermore, the design features 
of the possible target equipment may 
also result in a quite different resistan-
ce to damages caused by the escalation 
vectors. However, these elements are 
seldom taken into account in the avai-
lable escalation criteria reported in the 
technical literature.
Cozzani and Salzano [15] pointed out 
that there are many differences among 
the threshold values for accident esca-
lation reported in the literature. Among 
the factors which may have caused these 
apparent inconsistencies, two seem to be 
the most important: i) the lack of indica-
-
teristics of process equipment to which 
the thresholds should be applied; and ii) 
	
damage extension or loss intensity ne-
cessary to trigger an escalation.
An extensive work was carried out 
to obtain more robust values for es-
calation threshold. Observational data 
were combined to models developed 
for the assessment of equipment dama-
ge probability. An updated set of thres-
hold values for escalation resulting in 
domino accidents was proposed by 
Cozzani in [18].
In the future, inherent safety prin-
    	
 
of either passive or active strategies, 
should be considered for domino 
effects [21], [41], [20].
The key point in the assessment of 
escalation is the availability of models 
for equipment vulnerability. Early ap-
proaches were based on yes/no (0/1) 
damage tables derived from threshold 
values [6]. More recently, the need for 
     -
rent categories of process equipment 
was recognized by [16]. These authors 
also introduced damage states and loss 
intensity categories in the framework 
of escalation assessment [36, 37]. The-
se results were used by Landucci and 
coworkers to introduce an approach to 
damage probability models for equip-
!"+%<
The relevant work undertaken over 
the past decade rendered possible the 
quantitative risk assessment of domi-
no accidents. Examples of individual 
and societal risk calculations are re-
ported in the literature [17], [20] based 
on installation lay-out and population 
distribution [7]. Figure 1 reports an 
example of results obtained in the cal-
culation of individual risk due to do-
mino scenarios in a plant section. The 
calculations were carried out using the 
Aripar-GIS tool [19].
Interaction of natural 
events with industrial 
equipment
When natural events interact with in-
dustrial facilities and in particular che-
mical, petrochemical and oil processing 
industries, severe releases of hazardous 
materials may be triggered, possibly re-
sulting in direct damages and injuries 
to people in the nearby area, as well as 
in indirect damages due to the delay of 
rescue operations following the natural 
event [22], [29], [35]. These techno-
logical accidents triggered by natural 
*=>?K=-
ral-Technologic) scenarios [30].
Therefore, Quantitative Risk Analy-
sis (QRA) of industrial facilities has 
to properly take into account the mul-
tiple hazards threatening critical equi-
pments, which may possibly lead to 
catastrophic accidents. Despite these 
considerations, engineering procedu-
res able to quantitatively evaluate the 
effects of natural events on industrial 
equipment in a QRA framework are not 
well established, although the determi-
nistic assessment of single case-studies 
is possible by the use of complex ap-
	-
tural analysis.
>	

approach for the risk assessment of ac-
cidents triggered by external events in 
chemical and process plants is of ut-
most importance for the correct analy-
sis of hazards due to major accidents 
[3]. In the following, a procedure de-
veloped for the quantitative assessment 
of the hazard due to accidental events 
triggered by external events in che-
mical and process plants is presented. 
The approach developed may be used 
 
     
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tornados, hurricanes, volcanoes, lands-
lides. In the following, the application 
of the procedure to earthquake events is 
only presented for the sake of brevity.
Seismic Hazard
Ground motions generated by seismic 
waves radiating from the earthquake 
focus to the site, may be related to three 
types of mechanisms that interact to 
generate the overall event: source, path 
and site. These parameters summarize 
all the random features of earthquakes, 
including energy, frequency contents, 
phases and others which may affect 
the structural response of process items 
[38]. Currently, the problem of the de-

seismic behaviour of structures is one 
of the main topics of earthquake en-
gineering. However, empirical vulne-
rability analyses are often carried out 
in terms of Peak Ground Acceleration 
(PGA), mainly because it is relatively 
easy to infer (i.e. by earthquake in-
tensity conversion) while other, more 
complex, seismic intensity variables 
may not be available at the site of post-
earthquake damage observation.
According to Probabilistic Seismic 
Hazard Analysis (PSHA) [13], the pro-
bability of exceedance of any seismic 
intensity variable IM (e.g. PGA) at any 
location should be always related to a 
time interval T – in the present case the 
service life of the structure. Eventually, 
a seismic hazard H (or “exceedance 
		
?-
llowing equation: 
which represents the probability that 
a given seismic intensity exceeds the 
constant value a during the time in-
terval T. Local authorities commonly 
provide tools for PSHA in terms of the 
intensity measure of interest both in 
Europe and USA (i.e. http://www.usgs.
gov). If different intensity parameters 
are used, all ground shaking parameters 
are related: details of correlation may 
be found elsewhere [11].
When equipment structural dama-
ge probability due to seismic action 
should be estimated, the probability 
of the collapse of the system should 
be evaluated for all possible values of 
seismic intensity (IM) combined with 
the probability of occurring of the spe-

V
Given any value of IM(PGA), and its 
probability of occurrence, it is, thus, 
    		
 
structural failure of equipment.
Vulnerability: Statistical 
Inference of earthquake 
damage
In [38] and [23], the concept of limit 
     -
tion of threshold values, on the other an 
easy implementation of the approach 
within numerical codes for quantita-
tive risk assessment. Details on these 
functions are given by Finney in [24].
Quite clearly, fragilities may be eva-
luated either numerically, by means 
of appropriate numerical codes, or by 
experimental data, i.e. using the his-
torical database reporting the damage 
experienced by similar equipment un-
der the load of earthquakes characteri-
zed by similar intensities. 
Salzano et al. in [38], and Fabbrocino 
et al. in [23] analysed existing data con-
cerning post-earthquake damage ob-
servations for steel atmospheric tanks 
 	   
order to optimize the limit state classi-
<'
     
damage DS were reviewed to identify 
three levels of the intensity of loss of 
   RS (Release 
State): no loss – RS1, moderate loss – 
RS2, extensive loss of containment – 
RS3. The probability of occurrence of 
any limit state was thus assessed by fra-
gility curves, starting from a consistent 
historical data set describing the beha-
viour of tanks subjected to earthquakes:
In Eq. 4, PGA represents the seismic 
intensity (IM) that was assumed to tri-
gger the failure corresponding to the 
pre-assigned limit state. As discussed 
above, experimental lognormal fragili-
ty curves for steel storage tanks were 
converted into probit functions:
where Y is the probit value, and PGA is 
expressed in terms of gravity accelera-
tion g. As showed in Eq. (5), the probit 
function Y allows a useful and fast co-
rrelation of probit values to a dose (in 
this case represented by the PGA value) 
by means of the two constants k1 and 
k2. For any limit state RS, the probit 
function Y can be related to the proba-
bility of occurrence P by means of the 
following integral:
H (T) = P[PGA > a, T] (1)
(2)

=
=
1i
IMCollapseCollapse

ment damage following HAZUS da-
  !$X%  < \
linguistic term DS was referred to the 
mechanical (structural) damage, whe-
reas the term RS was used in order to 

from the DS level of damage to equi-
pment. In the same papers, the proba-
bility of occurrence of any limit state 
PDS or PRS was assessed by the use of 
fragility curves, starting from a consis-
tent data set describing the behavior of 
equipment loaded by earthquakes:
where  is respectively the standard de-
viation of the natural logarithm of PGA 
for the damage state DS or RS^
the median value of the PGA at which 
the equipment reaches the threshold of 
damage state DS or RS.
From the analysis of fragility data, 
a probit function can be easily deve-
loped. This statistical tool is useful to 
achieve a linearization of the results 
-
(3)
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Numerical or graphical solution of 
this integral are reported in the lite-
rature. Details of the entire statistical 
procedure are extensively discussed 
elsewhere [24].
Fabbrocino et al. in [23] report the 
  

and probit values for every RS level, 
     
either unanchored atmospheric storage 
tank or anchored storage tank. These 
(5)
(6)
Y = k1 + k2 ln 10
2 PGA 
	
analysis based on consistent number of 
data reported in the literature.
For the same equipment categories, 
Table 2 reports the minimum threshold 
value of PGA for loss of containment 
(PGAk). Results show that, as expec-
ted, PGAk strongly depends on the 
 < > 	 
value for RS3, which is important for 
risk assessment purposes, since catas-
trophic releases may trigger accidental 
scenarios, was reached for near full 
unanchored storage tanks. This value 
may be considered as the conservati-
ve option in a QRA context, if limited 
information is available on the type of 
      
level, which possibly varies with time.
The above approach was further deve-
loped by Campedel et al. in [8] and Sal-
zano et al. in [39], that obtained a quan-
titative assessment of seismic-induced 
scenarios in process plants using  speci-
!+%<
Security
After 9/11, the concern for security is-
sues related to process plants and oil & 
gas installations greatly increased [10]. 
If security is a concern, ruling out sabo-
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the industrial domain, which can be 
either intended to affect the industrial 
system or aimed at the urban system 
or any possible non-industrial target, 
hence indirectly hitting the installation 
(Figure 2).
{`
some considerations should be addres-
sed to the mass of explosive needed to 
reach the target (e.g., the primary ins-
tallation). A minimum pressure of 7kPa 
[18] is considered as the conservative 
threshold value for structural dama-
ge to process equipment, whatever the 
primary explosion in terms of duration, 
and assuming TNT as reference explo-
sive. Thus, by the inverse problem, the 
minimum amount of TNT needed to 
cause damage to a reference installation 
may be calculated with respect to the 
effective distance for the propagation of 
shock wave having the necessary inten-
sity to cause damage. The distance can 
be compared with the radius of protec-
tion of the installation, rmax in Figure 2, 
by using the well-known mass-scaled 
plot for point-source explosives. This 
evaluation is plotted in Figure 3, whe-
re it is clear that the mass of explosive 
needed to reach even the very conserva-
tive reference threshold value assumed 
(7kPa) is absolutely out of reach of a 
terrorist attack for distances over about 
250 m, for which 2 tons of TNT are nee-
ded. This value can be further limited if 
considering that the explosive strength 
is generally evaluated by considering a 
Tabla 2.BC
!	,,"/BC0 
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-
pical situation when either indirect or 
direct actions are considered. Indeed, 
buildings, plant walls, urban environ-
ment or in many cases the local orogra-
phy may protect the installation from 
attack. Finally, taking the industrial 
domain as the area with r<rmax and the 
}}max, it can be derived 
that attacks with explosives are unlikely 
to produce structural damage to indus-
    `< >
industrial installation is inherently safe 
for distances over 250 m with respect to 
explosives if loss of containment is con-
sidered. This value is absolutely com-
patible with typical values for VCEs and 
other industrial scenarios.
Conclusions
A comprehensive and complete risk 
assessment of chemical and process 
plants, as required by modern society, 
should be addressed to include all type 
of initiating events in the analysis. Thus, 
natural events, external attacks, or in-
dustrial accidents occurring in surroun-
ding installations should be included in 
the analysis. Indeed, triggering causes 
not related to faults or human errors in 


-
ned as “external events” and may affect 
the integrity of process installations 
and of process equipment, giving rise 
to catastrophic consequences involving 
 -
mable and/or toxic materials.
The present contribution summari-
zes the recent results obtained by the 
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authors within this framework. Simpli-

QRA approach to include the risk due to 
*?<-
ggering events such as domino effects, 
earthquakes and attack with explosive 


 -
ne conservative thresholds for damage 
and escalation with respect to the iden-
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